ISAS Working Paper

Why Size Matters: Majority-Minority Status and Muslim Piety in South and Southeast Asia[1]

Riaz Hassan[2]

The differences in the socio-economic outcomes of majorities and minorities have been well studied in sociology. This paper breaks new ground by investigating the effect on religiosity of majority–minority status in two Muslim-majority and two Muslim-minority countries of South and Southeast Asia. Religiosity is conceptualised as a multi-dimensional phenomenon. The paper critically discusses this conceptualisation through an analysis of survey data. The findings show significant differences in the sociological profiles of religiosity in Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority countries. The architecture of religiosity is significantly more orthodox in Muslim-majority countries. The paper concludes with a discussion of the implications of the findings for understanding the nature and dynamics of religious orthodoxy, the nature of civil society, religious reform and the role of collective religious social movements.

---

[2] Professor Riaz Hassan is Visiting Research Professor at the Institute of South Asian Studies (ISAS), an autonomous research institute at the National University of Singapore. He can be contacted at isasriaz@nus.edu.sg. The author bears full responsibility for the facts cited and opinions expressed in this paper.

This paper will investigate the effect on the architecture of Muslim piety or religiosity of the majority or minority status of religious groups in society. The conditions of modernity and post-modernity have ruptured the nexus between blood and soil. A natural outcome of this development has been the emergence of multi-religious and multi-ethnic societies. This is reflected in the demographic composition of most societies in the modern world. Consequently, in the majority of such societies, religion has become an important marker of identity. Under conditions of modernity, the role of religious institutions in public affairs has changed significantly. The functional roles of religious institutions have declined, but their performance roles have been boosted. Religion has also become an important site of political contest, influence and welfare (Luhmann 1982). This is especially so in the South and Southeast Asian countries (Hassan 2002).

In most countries, religious communities do not enjoy demographic equality. The religious landscape is more often than not characterised by majority and minority religions. This is the situation in the countries under study. Against this demographic background, the present study will explore whether majority–minority demographic status has any effect on religiosity. The research will focus on four countries of South and Southeast Asia, namely India, Pakistan, Malaysia and Singapore. These countries offer almost a natural experimental setting. Pakistan and Malaysia are Muslim-majority while India and Singapore are Muslim-minority countries. The scope of this paper is confined to the investigation of Muslim religiosity. In other words, the research will investigate whether the majority-minority status of Muslims in a society affects the architecture of their religious consciousness or religiosity.

The paper is organised in several parts. It begins with a discussion of the broader question of the effects of demographic minority-majority status on social and economic outcomes. The following section will outline a conceptualisation of Muslim religiosity. The final sections will introduce this study, report its findings and discuss the implications of the research results.

Social and Economic Consequences of Minority-Majority Status

The differences in social and economic outcomes of majority and minority groups have been well studied in sociology. In particular, there are numerous studies on minority groups and

inequality. These studies show that minorities have lower income, higher poverty rates and higher mortality rates (Kahanec 2006; Massey and Eggers 1990; Smedley, Stith, and Nelson 2002; Williams and Jackson 2005; McLaughlin and Stokes 2002). The factors accounting for these disadvantages include lower levels of social capital, family size, high dependency rates, discrimination, exclusion or political under-representation, barriers to access to public services, and high unemployment and underemployment rates (Kurthen and Heisler 2009; O'Neil 1990; Gradin 2012; Norris 2004; Doty and Holmgren 2006). All these factors inhibit social contact between the minority and majority populations and preserve the status quo of limited participation of minorities in public life.

Another large body of studies looks at the relationship between the size of the minority and inequality (Albrecht, Albrecht, and Murguia 2005: Blalock 1956; Cohen 1998; Frisbie and Neidert 1977; Kahanec 2006; Quillian 1995; Rapoport and Weiss 2003; Tienda and Lii 1987; Williams 1947). The general finding in these and similar studies is that the level of inequality, grievances and deprivations increases when the relative size of the minority increases.

Several theories have been proposed to link the growing size of a minority population to the increasing inequalities. The foundational group position theory of prejudice (Blumer 1958) proposes that there is a resource-based conflict between the majority and the minority groups. As the majority perceives an increasing threat from the minority over the control of resources, the level of prejudice (as a defence mechanism) also increases. The majority then proceeds to counter and minimise the perceived threat, using the available structural mechanisms that the majority controls. A history of unequal power positions of the minority and majority is particularly important in the development of this conflict.

Similarly, the power-threat theory (Blalock 1967) states that the minority's size influences the level of discrimination because the majority perceives the minority as a threat in the competition for economic and political resources. The majority places various restrictions on the minority group which increases the inequality. The intergroup threat theory (Stephan, Ybarra, and Morrison 2009) echoes Blalock's theory and adds that the history of conflict is important in forming the intergroup perceptions of threat. Such perceptions would be strongest between two groups of similar size and power, and with a long history of conflict.

Other theories such as the integrated threat theory of prejudice (Stephan and Stephan 2000) advocate that intergroup attitudes are formed by the amount and the quality of the intergroup contact, group status, identification, knowledge and conflict. These relationships are mediated by realistic and symbolic threats, intergroup anxiety and negative stereotypes. Quillian (1995) argues that the perception of threat by the majority (which, in turn, determines the level of prejudice) intensifies when the relative size of the minority increases and especially when economic conditions worsen.

The above-mentioned studies mainly deal with a minority's economic, political and social disadvantages, such as differential access to public services, lower quality of social capital and power. There is near absence of studies dealing with the subject matter of this paper, that is, the impact of majority-minority status on religiosity. Such an investigation requires measures of religiosity and appropriate empirical data. Fortuitously, over the past several years, the author has carried out a number of surveys of Muslim religiosity in the aforementioned four countries. The availability of these data has made this study possible. The following section provides details of how Muslim religiosity was conceptualised in these surveys.

Conceptualisation of Muslim Religiosity

Religion is the essence of Muslim identity. It applies to anyone who claims to be a Muslim, irrespective of their nationality and whether they are devoutly religious or use the label as a cultural signifier. Religion also provides a means to create a morally coherent and meaningful life. In philosophy and sociology, there is a long-established tradition that postulates a link between the religious precepts and moral character of a community and its political organisation. Such considerations invest the study of religious piety with significant sociological import. An analysis of Muslim religious commitment can provide vital insights into the nature and character of Islamic consciousness, and its relationship to the political and social organisation and trends in society.

There is considerable debate among Muslims about the nature, as well as the content, of religious commitment that a Muslim must display and adhere to in order to be a Muslim. One of the key claims in this debate is that, in order to be a Muslim, there must be evidence of

4

religious piety at behavioural, ethical and cognitive levels. Islamic philosophy and theology contain a large body of expository literature dealing with this issue.

Being 'religious' can mean different things to different people. The meanings given to the words 'religious' and 'religiosity' cover a broad spectrum of activities. Many Muslims are very sceptical and sometimes disparaging of the 'religiosity' or religiousness of their fellow Muslims. For many, 'religiosity' is essentially a spiritual experience of a very intimate nature not amenable to objective empirical study. The only way to appreciate or comprehend it, they hold, is to observe a person's behaviour over a long period, not only in the religious domain but also in other domains of life. For many, being 'religious' entails not only religious worship but also an ethical commitment and a code of conduct that covers all spheres of life. This, some argue, is too difficult to observe, document, study and analyse. In other words, the term 'religious' is seen as having a variety of meanings and multiple dimensions. They might well represent various aspects of a single phenomenon, but they are not simple synonyms. Just because people are religious in one way does not mean they will be religious in other ways. Social circumstances encourage particular types of sensibilities. People do not believe what makes no sense to them – and what makes sense to them depends on their social environment (Douglas 1970).

Following the author's previous studies, religiosity in this paper is conceptualised as a multidimensional phenomenon. In their seminal sociological studies of religious piety, American sociologists Rodney Stark and Charles Glock addressed the question of the multidimensionality of religiosity. They took up the challenge of identifying different dimensions of religiosity and also how to measure them methodologically. For them, the core of religiosity was religious commitment. They also took up the task of defining religious commitment and how it is operationalised, and undertook a linguistic analysis in order to determine the different things that can be meant by the term and the different ways in which an individual can be religious. They then tried to analyse whether religiousness manifested in one of these ways has anything to do with its expression in others (Stark and Glock 1968).

Any serious student of religion will acknowledge that expressions of religion vary greatly among world religions. Different religions expect quite different things from their followers. For example, regular participation in Holy Communion is obligatory for many Christians, but the practice is alien to Muslims. Similarly, the Muslim imperative of performing Hajj

(pilgrimage to Mecca) during one's lifetime is alien to Christians. The expectations of Hinduism and Buddhism are again different from those of Islam and Christianity.

Although there is great variation in religious expressions, there also exists considerable consensus among the world's religions as to how religiosity ought to be manifested. Stark and Glock identify five core dimensions of religiosity within which all of the many and diverse manifestations of the world's different religions can be ordered. They label these dimensions as the ideological, the ritualistic, the experiential, the intellectual and the consequential.

The ideological dimension refers to the fundamental beliefs to which a religious person is expected, and often required, to adhere. The ritualistic dimension encompasses the specific acts of worship and devotion that people perform to express their religious commitment. Often, these include public or communal, as well as private or personal, acts of worship. All religions have certain expectations, however imprecisely they might be stated, that a religious person, at some time or other, will achieve direct knowledge of the ultimate reality, or will experience a religious emotion. Included in this category are all those feelings, perceptions and sensations – whether felt by an individual or a person or a religious group – that involve some type of communication with God or a transcendental being. Stark and Glock label this the experiential dimension.

The intellectual dimension refers to the expectation that religious persons will possess some knowledge of the basic tenets of their faith and its sacred scriptures. This dimension is clearly related to the ideological dimension, since knowledge of a belief is a necessary condition for its acceptance. However, belief need not follow from knowledge; nor does all religious knowledge bear on belief. The consequential dimension encompasses the secular effects of religious belief, practice, experience and knowledge on the individual. It includes all those religious prescriptions that specify what people ought to do and the attitudes they ought to hold as a consequence of their religion.

Validation and verification of the multidimensionality of religion have been achieved primarily through studies of inter-correlations of scales that seek to represent different dimensions. American sociologists Gordon De Jong, Joseph Faulkner and Rex Warland found evidence of six dimensions of religion (see Wulff 1997). Their evidence also showed a

cluster of three dimensions encompassing belief, experience and practice, which they labelled 'generic religiosity'. The cumulative evidence from sociological and psychological studies of religious commitment continues to provide support for Stark and Glock's multidimensional conceptualisation of religiosity.

Surveys of Muslim Religiosity in Pakistan, India, Malaysia and Singapore

As mentioned earlier, over the past several years, the author has been conducting studies of social, religious and political trends in Muslim countries, which included surveys of Muslim religiosity using Stark and Glock's five dimensions of religiosity. The findings from these studies have appeared in three books, *Faithlines: Muslim Conceptions of Islam and Society* (Hassan 2002), *Inside Muslim Minds* (Hassan 2008) and *Islam and Society: Sociological Explorations* (Hassan 2013). These surveys included two countries, namely Pakistan and Malaysia. The surveys of Singapore and India were carried out as separate projects in 2011 and 2015. All these surveys used the same survey instrument (available from the author) which included questions on the aspects of religiosity mentioned in the previous section.[3] The Likert scale was used to ascertain the responses ranging from strongly agree, agree, not sure, disagree to strongly disagree. The findings reported in the following tables display data combining the responses 'strongly agree' and 'agree'. To ascertain whether the differences in the distributions of responses in the tables were statistically significant or not, chi square tests were performed on the distributions of responses in each table.

Ideological Dimension

This dimension comprises the religious beliefs a Muslim is expected, and indeed required, to hold and adhere to. The beliefs of Islam, as with other religions, can be divided into three types. The first type warrants the existence of the divine and defines its character. The second

---

[3] The specific questions relating to each dimensions were formulated from several survey questionnaires on religious piety, including Glock and Stark (1968), World Value Survey Questionnaire (Inglehart 1990), Survey of Religion (Tamney 1976); Religious and Social Change in Pakistan (Hassan1980); Religious Attitudes Questionnaires (Robison and Shaver 1973). The other sources for developing questions were some of the key texts on Muslim religiosity, including Watt (1983), Gellner (I981), Rahman (1989 and 1982) as well as interviews with selected key Muslim scholars from Indonesia and Pakistan on their views on Muslim religiosity (For further details see Hassan 2002 Appendix A).

type explains the divine purpose and defines the believer's role with regard to that purpose. The third type provides grounds for the ethical strictures of religion. In sociological discourse, the three are generally described as warranting, purposive and implementing beliefs.

In Islam, great emphasis is placed on warranting and purposive beliefs. Mere emphasis on the beliefs, however, avoids the issue of their salience and function in the life of a believer. These can be assessed indirectly through the believer's ritual behaviour, which also relates to the other dimensions of religious piety. Here, the focus will be on the doctrinally inspired core beliefs that Muslims hold, and not on the meaning of these beliefs for them, since issues of meaning raise other complex questions and would require a separate study.

A large number of doctrinally inspired core beliefs were identified from the sacred Islamic texts and were presented to focus groups and to key selected informants in the author's previous studies. The following beliefs were most commonly mentioned and, therefore, were chosen to ascertain the magnitude and intensity of the ideological dimension: belief in Allah, belief in the Quranic miracles, belief in life after death, belief in the existence of the Devil and belief that only those who believe in the Prophet Muhammad can go to heaven. All five are primarily warranting and purposive beliefs. Table 1 provides survey findings for the ideological dimensions for the four selected countries.

The table shows a noticeable trend that Malaysian and Pakistani Muslims tend to have comparatively higher agreement rates for most items in the ideological dimension. To investigate this trend further, a summary index of orthodoxy dimension was constructed using the following methodology.

The response 'I know Allah really exists and I have no doubts about it' was given a score of 1; all other responses were scored as 0. A score of 1 was given to the response 'I believe that miracles happened the way the Quran says they did'; other responses were scored as 0. Similarly, the response 'completely true' to 'There is life after death', 'The Devil really exists', and 'Only those who believe in the Prophet Muhammad can go to heaven' was scored as 1; all other answers were scored as 0. Using these scores, an index of ideological orthodoxy was constructed. In this index, a score of 5 signifies high orthodoxy and a score of 0 signifies low orthodoxy.

Table 1: Ideological dimension

Belief in Allah	Pakistan	Malaysia	India	Singapore
1. I know Allah really exists and have no doubts about it.	97	96	53	95
2. While I have doubts, I feel I believe in Allah.	0.9	2	43	3
3. I find myself believing in Allah some of the time but not other times.	0.3	1	3	1
4. Other responses: I don't believe in a personal Allah, but do believe in a higher power of some kind; I don't believe whether there is an Allah and I don't believe there is any way to find out; I don't believe in Allah; None of the above responses represent what I believe about Allah.	1	2	1	0
Belief in the Quranic miracles				
1. I believe the miracles happened the way the Quran says they did.	94	95	22	81
2. I believe that miracles can be explained by natural causes.	3	3	8	9
3. I don't believe in miracles/not sure they happened.	2	2	69	10
There is life after death				
1. Completely true	95	92	79	64
2. Probably true	1	3	7.1	20
3. Not sure	1	2	11.0	8
4. Probably not true	0.2	-	1.5	2
5. Definitely not true	0.7	2	0.5	4
6. Do not know	0.3	-	0.4	3
Belief in Devil (Devil actually exists)				
1. Completely true	94	94	52	73
2. Probably true	2	5	27	19
3. Not sure	1	1	17	6
4. Probably not true	0.2	-	2.0	1
5. Definitely not true	0.7	-	0.7	0.2
6. Do not know	0.3	-	2.4	0.3
Only those who believe in the Prophet Muhammad can go to heaven				
1. Completely true	77	65	82	46
2. Probably true	4	10	10	24
3. Not sure	8	15	5	15
4. Probably not true	2	2	1	6
5. Definitely not true	4	3	2	5
6. Do not know	4	5	1	5

Source: Hassan (2008 and 2013) and Indian Muslim Religiosity unpublished survey data 2016.

Table 2: Index of orthodoxy of religious beliefs

	Pakistan	Malaysia	India	Singapore
5. High	76	55	12	36
4.	20	35	14	22
3. Medium	2	7	39	18
2.	1	3	22	16
1.	-	1	10	7
0. Low	-	-	2	1
Chi sq p-value: 8.43289				

Source: Same as Table 1.

The data in Table 2 confirms the above-mentioned trend that the two Muslim-majority countries tend to be more orthodox than the two Muslim-minority countries.

Ritualistic Dimension

Rituals are an integral part of formal religion. They include religious practices such as worship, devotion, and the things people do to carry out their religious commitment. All religions include rituals of praise, petition, penance and obedience, although the emphasis on each of these rituals varies among different formal religions. In sociological analysis, rituals are regarded as playing an extremely important role in the maintenance of religious institutions, the religious community and religious identity. Participation in collective religious rituals plays an important role in the socialisation of the individual through unconscious appropriation of common values and common categories of knowledge and experience.

Religious rituals can be analysed in at least two ways. Firstly, the analysis can focus on distinguishing individuals in terms of the frequency with which they engage in ritualistic activities. Secondly, it can focus on the meaning of ritual acts for the individuals who engage in them. The analysis here will focus primarily on the first perspective, but it will attempt to explore the question of meaning as well.

Islam is a ritual-rich religion. Muslims are required to perform specific rituals as an expression of their faith. Rituals such as *salat* (daily prayers) and *wudu* (the cleansing of hands, face and feet before performing the prayers) have always been, and remain, significant in promoting a sense of religious community among Muslims. The frequency with which

religious rituals are observed is a useful and meaningful indicator of an individual's religiosity.

These considerations led to the selection of the following rituals to capture this dimension: performance of *salat* five times or more a day, recitation of the Holy Quran daily or several times a week, observance of fasting during the month of Ramadan and payment of *zakat* (alms or tax for the poor). The focus is on the frequency of their observance. These rituals are interrelated at both the individual and collective levels. Table 3 presents findings pertaining to the ritualistic dimension.

Table 3: Ritualistic dimension

How often you perform *salat*?	Pakistan	Malaysia	India	Singapore
1. One to four times daily	20	5	49	43
2. Five times daily	46	72	24	51
3. More than five times	11	19	2	-
4. Only on Friday	5	-	25	-
5. Only on special occasions	3	-	1	-
6. Never	11	-	0	5
7. Occasionally/sometimes	2	-	0	-
Paid *zakat* in the past 12 months				
1. Yes	58	80	83	72
2. No	39	20	17	28
3. Missing	-	-	-	-
Fasted during Ramadan				
1. Yes	93	99	98	98
2. No	5	1	2	2
How often you read the Quran?				
1. I read it regularly, once a day or more.	32	24	29	10
2. I read it regularly, several days a week.	16	20	23	14
3. I read it regularly, once a week.	3	4	22	8
4. I read it quite often but not at regular intervals.	18	25	4	16
5. I read it once in a while.	20	15	2	26
6. I read it only on special occasions.	5	9	3	12
7. I never read the Quran or read it rarely.	5	2	17	13

Source: Same as Table1.

The findings indicate relatively higher observance of Islamic rituals in the Muslim-majority countries, namely, Pakistan and Malaysia. To obtain an overall estimate of the observance of religious practices, an index of ritual behaviour was constructed using the following methodology.

Responses indicating performance of prayers five times or more a day were scored as 1, and all other responses as 0; 'yes' responses to having paid *zakat* and fasting during the previous year were scored as 1 and 'no' responses as 0; responses indicating reading the Quran once a day or several times a week were scored as 1 and all other responses as 0. The resulting index ranged from 4 (indicating a high score) to 0 (indicating a low score). Table 4 shows the distribution of respondents in the various categories.

Table 4: Index of ritualism

	Pakistan	Malaysia	India	Singapore
4. High	24	34	12	16
3.	31	47	34	33
2.	28	16	46	34
1. Low	17	3	8	17
Chi sq p-value: 7.43792				

Source: Same as Table 1.

The findings corroborate the evidence presented for the individual items that the two Muslim-majority countries display higher rates of religious practice than the two Muslim-minority countries.

Devotional Dimension

This dimension is akin to the ritualistic dimension. Rituals are highly formalised aspects of religious expression and commitment. Often, a religious person participates in personal and somewhat private acts of worship. Social pressure and other non-religious considerations can sometimes motivate people to participate in formal religious rituals. This is especially true in Islam, given the pervasiveness of religious rituals in daily life and also the ease with which a person can participate in ubiquitous rituals such as daily prayers. In other words, participation in religious rituals might, or might not, indicate religious commitment or piety. This, however, does not apply to acts of devotion that are private and often spontaneous. For these reasons, devotionalism is a good and meaningful indicator of religious commitment. The measure of devotionalism used in the surveys was consulting the Quran to make daily decisions.

Table 5: Devotionalism

How the Quran helps you in making everyday decisions	Pakistan	Malaysia	India	Singapore
1. I hardly think of the Quran as I go about my daily life.	33	1	34	18
2. I can't think of specific examples; nevertheless I feel sure that the Quran is still of help in my daily life.	17	67	33	38
3. I remember specific times where it has helped me in a very direct way in making decisions.	44	9	12	23
4. I often consult the Quran to make specific decisions.	5	21	21	18
5. Others	1	2	1	-

Source: Same as Table 1.

Since devotionalism was ascertained by a single item, the result was used as a proxy for the devotionalism index. The findings reported in Table 5 show that, while there is no significant trend favouring Muslim-majority countries, if we take response categories 3 and 4 the trend tends to favour Muslim-majority countries

Experiential Dimension

The cognitive dimension of religiosity includes feelings, knowledge and emotions arising from or relating to some type of communication with, or experience of, the ultimate divine reality. These experiences are generally ordered around notions of concern, cognition, trust, faith or fear. Such expectations are found in all religions. Sufi traditions, as well as many traditions of 'folk' or 'popular' Islam, place great emphasis on personal religious experience or communication with the divine as an affirmation of individual piety. The experiential dimension invariably involves subjective feelings, sensations or visions that arise out of an individual's presumed contact with a supernatural consciousness. Religious experience encompasses occasions defined by those undergoing them as encounters, or contacts, between themselves and some supernatural consciousness. The five feelings used to assess religious experiences were: a feeling of being in the presence of Allah, a sense of being saved by the Prophet Muhammad, a sense of being afraid of Allah, a feeling of being punished by Allah for some wrong done, and a feeling of being tempted by the Devil. Experiences of this character can be described as confirming, responsive, salvation, sanctioning and temptation, respectively. The survey results are reported in Table 6.

Table 6: Experiential dimension

Ever felt in the presence of Allah	Pakistan	Malaysia	India	Singapore
1. Yes, I am sure I have	57	37	74	58
2. Yes, I think I have	25	48	25	29
3. No	18	15	1	14
Ever felt saved by the Prophet				
1. Yes, I am sure I have	36	24	43	42
2. Yes, I think I have	27	49	46	33
3. No	37	27	11	25
Ever felt a sense of being afraid of Allah				
1. Yes, I am sure I have	82	76	56	68
2. Yes, I think I have	13	22	41	28
3. No	5	2	3	4
Ever felt a sense of being punished by Allah for something you did				
1. Yes, I am sure I have	66	63	56	57
2. Yes, I think I have	26	33	38	36
3. No	8	4	6	8
Ever felt a sense of being tempted by the Devil				
1. Yes, I am sure I have	67	62	41	50
2. Yes, I think I have	24	35	37	36
3. No	9	4	23	14

Source: Same as Table 1.

The results show that respondents in Muslim-majority countries overall have higher scores. Again, to get a clearer picture, an index of experiential dimension was constructed using the following methodology. The response category 'Yes, I am sure I have' was scored as 1 for all five questions; all other responses were scored as 0. This produced an index ranging from 0 to 5. The distribution of respondents from the four countries shown in Table 7 reveals that respondents from Muslim-majority countries tend to have higher scores than those from the Muslim-minority countries of India and Singapore.

Table 7: Index of experiential religiosity

	Pakistan	Malaysia	India	Singapore
5. High	22	15	11	30
4.	23	12	23	12
3.	22	18	23	14
2.	16	17	19	12
1.	9	13	13	13
0. Low	8	13	11	20
Chi sq p-value: 0.027918605				

Source: Same as Table 1.

Consequential Dimension

All religions concern themselves with the effects of religion on the believers and their daily lives. Some religions are more explicit about these effects than others. In Islam, submission to its religious teachings is seen as the certain way of achieving divine merit in this world and spiritual salvation in the other. Rewards are sometimes immediate, and include such things as peace of mind, a sense of well-being, personal happiness and even tangible success in activities of daily life. Islam also warns of the consequences of not subscribing to its fundamental religious beliefs and teachings.

In Islam, great emphasis is placed on warranting beliefs about the existence of Allah and the divine creation of life. Disbelievers are declared to be *kafir* (infidel), condemned to eternal damnation. For the survey, two conceptions were identified that indicate defiance of divine injunctions. Respondents were asked the following questions in an attempt to measure the strength of their warranting beliefs: 'Would you agree that a person who says there is no Allah is likely to hold dangerous views?' and 'Do you agree or disagree with Darwin's theory of evolution?' The stronger their warranting beliefs, the more likely they were to feel that disbelievers were dangerous and that Darwin's theory could not possibly be true. The survey results are reported in Tables 8. The results for the first question show higher agreement rates for Muslim-majority countries. And for the second question, if we use response category 4 as an indicator of orthodoxy, once again Muslim-majority countries display higher scores.

Table 8: Consequential dimension

A person who says there is no Allah is likely to hold dangerous political views	Pakistan	Malaysia	India	Singapore
1. Agree	74	71	69	32
2. Disagree	14	8	17	32
3. Uncertain	12	21	14	37
Agree with Darwin's theory of evolution				
1. The theory is almost certainly true	5	2	32	2
2. The theory is probably true	9	9	40	9
3. The theory is probably false	12	7	17	19
4. The theory cannot possibly be true	60	54	6	36
5. I never thought about this before	14	28	5	34

Source: Same as Table 1.

To ascertain the summary trend, an index was constructed using the following methodology. Agreement with the question that a person who says there is no Allah is likely to hold

dangerous political views was scored as 1 and other responses as 0. For the Darwin question, the response that the theory could not possibly be true was scored as 1 and all other responses were scored as 0. The results shown in Table 9 below confirm that respondents from Muslim-majority countries have significantly higher rates of consequential religiosity.

Table 9: Index of consequential religiosity

	Pakistan	Malaysia	India	Singapore
2. High	46	40	3	10
1.	42	47	69	49
0. Low	12	14	28	41
Chi sq p-value: 1.33807				

Source: Same as Table 1.

The analysis reported in the above tables offers not very robust but reasonably strong evidence that the architecture of religiosity in Pakistan and Malaysia, the two Muslim-majority countries, is different from that of India and Singapore, the two Muslim-minority countries. The point to note is that profiles of religiosity in Muslim-majority countries tend to be comparatively more orthodox than that of Muslim-minority countries.[4] This can be taken as evidence of the effect of demographic factors on religiosity. To assess the validity of this finding, further analysis was undertaken by comparing pairs of countries for each dimension of religiosity. This analysis is reported below.

Pairwise Analysis

Further statistical analysis was applied to test the significance of responses in pairs of countries, for example, India-Pakistan, India-Singapore and India-Malaysia. If the differences were statistically significant in the pair, it was given a value of 1, and if it was not significant, it received a value of 0 (zero). The result of this analysis is given in Table 10. This table offers an overview of how religiously and culturally close Muslim countries are to each other. Each pair of countries gets one point if there is no statistically significant difference between them for each survey question and zero if there is. This means the higher the score, the closer they are to each other. The results show that Pakistan and Malaysia are closest in the

---

[4]   The evidence shows that state sponsored religious bureaucracies tend to contribute to enhancing religious orthodoxy (See Hassan 1982 and 2014; Mohamad and Saravanamuttu 2015). In fact, the evidence from the author's studies shows that integration of religion and the state may not be in the best interest of religious institutions because when a state carries a deficit of trust in the public mind, public interest in religious institutions can also be eroded (see Hassan 2002: 157-165).

architecture of their religiosity to each other than Pakistan is to India and Malaysia is to Singapore. In fact, the evidence shows that Indian and Pakistani and Malaysian-Singaporean Muslims have the highest 'farness' scores. This finding is counter-intuitive. One would have expected that the geographical proximity and, more importantly, the historical and cultural ties between Indian-Pakistani and Malaysian-Singaporean Muslims would have influenced the architectures of their religiosity. This, obviously, is not what is revealed by the above analyses. Can we, therefore, infer that these findings are being produced by the majority-minority effect on religiosity? The author believes we can.

Table 10: Pairwise analysis of significance of differences between countries for distribution of responses for each item included in the five dimensions of religiosity

Question	Countries					
	Pak-Mal	**Pak-Ind**	**Pak-Sing**	**Mal-Ind**	**Mal-Sing**	**Ind-Sing**
Belief in Allah	1	0	1	0	1	0
Belief in Quranic miracles	1	0	0	0	0	0
Belief in life after death	1	0	0	0	0	0
Belief in Devil	1	0	0	0	0	0
Belief that only believers go to heaven	1	1	0	1	0	0
Frequency of *salat*	0	0	0	0	0	0
Paid *zakat*	0	0	0	1	0	0
Fasted during Ramadan	1	1	1	1	1	1
Frequency of reading Quran	1	0	0	0	0	0
Quran helps make decisions	0	0	0	0	0	1
Felt in presence of Allah	0	0	1	0	0	0
Felt saved by the Prophet	0	0	1	0	0	0
Felt afraid of Allah	1	0	0	0	1	1
Felt punished by Allah	1	1	1	1	1	1
Felt tempted by Devil	1	0	0	0	0	1
Agrees that unbelievers are dangerous	1	1	0	1	0	0
Agrees with evolution	1	0	0	0	0	0
Nearness	**12**	**4**	**5**	**5**	**4**	**5**

Source: Same as Table 1.

Figure 1 provides a multi-dimensional network diagram showing how culturally and religiously close different pairs of countries are to each other. The differences are expressed in percentage term of closeness based on the pairwise analysis performed for Table 10.

Figure 1: Multidimensional network of cultural and religious closeness between different pairs of countries

Source: Same as Table 1.

Discussion

The findings of this paper show significant differences in the sociological profiles of religiosity in Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority countries. The architecture of religiosity is significantly more orthodox in Muslim-majority countries. This has significant sociological implications which warrant attention. The findings also make an original contribution by studying the effects of minority or majority status on religiosity. Previous studies have entirely focused on the socio-economic outcomes of majority–minority differences. To the best of the author's knowledge, this the first study of its type. Before discussing the significance of these findings, a critical appraisal of the methodology and the findings is warranted. Firstly, the conceptualisation of religiosity is based on Glock and Stark's work on piety at the University of California, Berkeley (Glock 1962; Glock and Stark 1965). The theoretical lineage of their work can be traced to the works of Emile Durkheim, the pre-eminent social scientist of sociology and anthropology of religious life. For Durkheim (2001), religion and religiosity are a system of ideas that enable individuals to construct for themselves a representation of the society of which they are members, and the obscure but

intimate relations they have with it. Religion for Durkheim represented society and social relations in a cognitive sense to the mind or intellect. From this perspective, religion affords a means of comprehending or rendering intelligible the reality of the society. For believers, religious beliefs, experiences and practices are a particular way of understanding their society and their relations with it, as well as a way of expressing and dramatising these aspects of their life in a particular symbolic idiom.

Building on Durkheim's work, Mary Douglas (1970) argues that the ways in which social reality constructs consciousness are as important as the ways that reality itself is socially constructed. Particular social settings encourage certain ways of seeing the world. Douglas offers a sociological theory regarding the plausibility of different forms of religiosity, world view and ideology. She related different varieties of beliefs and practices to different types of societies. Individuals in different settings, according to Douglas, are biased towards different cosmologies. People do not believe what makes no sense to them – and what makes sense to them depends on their social environment. And, thus, the symbolic world of a people becomes structured like its social world. These analyses show that expressions of religiosity are largely a product of social conditions, and demographic reality is one such condition.

What about the survey methodology? Can we capture expressions of religiosity through the methodology of survey research? The obvious problem here is that the survey questions might be interpreted differently by respondents in different cultures. To overcome this bias, the survey questionnaire used in the study was translated into different languages and then back-translated to smooth out the biases. It was also subjected to expert reviews. Finally, statistical tests were applied to determine the significance levels of the distribution of responses. On the basis of these procedures, it seems reasonable to claim that the findings reported here are reasonable proxies of the reality of the religiosity of the respondents. Obviously, the validity of the findings of this study can be assessed through replication of this research.

What is the sociological significance of these findings? The author would suggest that the findings have significant implications for advancing understanding of the nature and dynamics of religious orthodoxy, the nature of civil society and religious reforms. The main finding of the study is that Muslim-majority countries tend to be more orthodox than Muslim-minority countries. Why is this? Religious orthodoxy is not merely a body of beliefs and

opinions but a practice that stipulates a relationship of power to knowledge, crystallising in attempts to regulate, uphold, require or adjust correct practices and to condemn, exclude, undermine or replace incorrect ones (Asad 2009). Muslim-majority countries obviously are more likely to be successful in imposing hegemonic religious cosmologies than countries/societies in which Muslims are a minority. In the latter, the reality of their social environment will produce subjectivities more attuned to accommodation, compromise and pluralism. In other words, in Muslim-majority countries there will be a greater tendency to aspire to power. This may not be political power but, as Talal Asad (2009) has suggested, a hegemonic cultural and ideological power to regulate and uphold 'correct practices' and to condemn and replace incorrect ones. In Muslim-minority countries, the dominant narrative is likely to be around equality of citizenship and access to survival goods.

These conditions have implications for the nature of civil society as well as for the nature of social and radical movements aspiring to advance their preferred visions of the future. First, the author will consider the implications for civil society. According to the eminent theorist of civil society Ernest Gellner, the core of civil society is the idea of institutional and ideological pluralism which prevents central institutions of the state from establishing a monopoly over power and truth in society. More specifically, he defines civil society as

> that set of diverse non-governmental institutions which is strong enough to counterbalance the state and, while not preventing the state from fulfilling its role of keeper of the peace and arbiter between major interests, can nevertheless prevent it from dominating and atomising the rest of the society. (Gellner 1994: 5)

Other theorists define civil society as a civil sphere in which people organise their daily lives without the intervention of the state (Calhoun 1993).

Gellner's characterisation incorporates civil society's essential features, namely political-coercive centralisation, with the accountability and rotation of political and economic elites who receive fairly low rewards for operating the political apparatus and economic pluralism. The key institutions of society are relatively autonomous and functionally differentiated. Such a society is based not on tyranny, superstitions and hegemonic ideological cosmologies perpetrated by rulers and religious functionaries but on the rule of reason, with room for doubt. Religious orthodoxy, which appears to prevail in the two Muslim-majority countries,

makes them more susceptible to falling in the sway of hegemonic religious cosmologies without their supporters having political power. The conditions of orthodoxy are also more likely to create amenable subjectivities through family and community socialisation and religious education in mainstream institutions of higher learning. These conditions and subjectivities are less likely to occur in the social environment of Muslim-minority countries. If they do occur, they are likely to be confined to small groups of believers.

Another phenomenon much discussed in debates about the Islamic world is religious fundamentalism. It can be taken as an expression of religious orthodoxy. Fundamentalism has been defined as a

> …distinctive tendency – a habit of mind and a pattern of behaviour – found within modern religious communities and embodied in certain representative individuals and movements. Fundamentalism is, in other words, a religious way of being that manifests itself as a strategy by which beleaguered believers attempt to preserve their distinctive identity as a people or group. (Marty and Appleby 1991: 34)

Echoing Talal Asad's characterisation of orthodoxy, fundamentalism seeks to fortify itself by a selective retrieval of doctrines, belief and practices from a sacred past as well as modern times. This renewed religious identity becomes the exclusive and absolute basis for a recreated political and social order.

Religious fundamentalism is a growing and important part of social change in Muslim countries. Its main goal is to establish the *shariah* (Islamic law) as the explicit, comprehensive and exclusive legal base of society. As the author has argued elsewhere, the genesis of fundamentalist movements is found not in religiosity but in the struggle between 'hybridity' and 'authenticity', an outcome of globalisation and modernisation. For much of Islamic history, there has been a common Muslim belief that Islam is not only a religion but also a complete way of life, which in Islamic discourse is known as the 'one religion, one culture' paradigm. Globalisation and modernisation have shattered this belief by revealing that the Muslim world is, in fact, socially and culturally and even religiously a 'hybrid' world. This realisation has provoked an unfavourable reaction among some groups of Islamic intellectuals towards this 'hybridity', which has given rise to fundamentalist movements

which seek to replace 'hybridity' with the 'authentic' Islamic way of life. These intellectuals feel that the Islamic identity is at risk and is being eroded by cultural and religious hybridity. They try to fortify their interpretations of religious ways of being through a selected retrieval of Islamic doctrines and practices from an Islamic past. Religious fundamentalism, in short, is a problem produced by the encounters between modernity and globalisation and the Islamic *ummah* (community) in all its diversity and cultural hybridity. Fundamentalist movements are present in all Islamic countries, but they are likely to find more affinity, appeal and fertile grounds in Muslim-majority countries.

The conditions of religious orthodoxy and the presence of fundamentalist movements in Muslim-majority countries have important implications for the civil society in those countries. They privilege conviction and truth over reason and doubt, which has a significant impact on the development and functioning of institutions of higher learning. It is worth noting that in both Pakistan and Malaysia the universities do not rank highly in the global ranking of universities. The evidence from the World Bank 'education index' shows that a large number of the poorest performers are Muslim-majority countries (Butler 2006). Part of the obvious reason for this situation is inadequate public investment in education and research and development. But this is compounded by prevailing cultural and political practices in Muslim-majority countries. The knowledge deficit arising from these conditions has far-reaching implications for growth and economic development.

In short, a robust civil society is a prerequisite for the development of countries based not on cosmologies of strongly held convictions and beliefs, but on a social order based on doubt, reason and compromise. Science and technology prosper only under conditions that privilege the rule of reason. The influence of orthodoxy and its accompanying cosmologies has a deleterious effect on academic conditions. The persistence of such conditions has far-reaching consequences for the well-being of Muslims, making this one of the greatest challenges facing the Muslim world.

Another implication of the prevalence of conditions of religious orthodoxy and the accompanying fundamentalist outlook is that they may not be conducive to creating conditions amenable to the reform of religious practices and thought. On this issue, Pakistani scholar Fazlur Rahman's observations are worth mentioning. Rahman (1989) argues that a central aim of the Quran was to establish a viable just and ethical social order on earth. This

aim was declared against the background of an Arabian society characterised by polytheism, exploitation of the poor, general neglect of social responsibility, moral degradation, injustice towards women and the less powerful, and tribalism. The Quran and the genesis of Muslim community occurred at a particular point in history and against a socio-historical background. The Quranic response is the product of a 'coherent philosophy' and 'attitude towards life' which Rahman calls the 'intellectual tradition' of Islam. This intellectual tradition was, and still is, subverted and undermined by the emphasis on 'literalist' interpretations of the Quran by the *ulema* (Islamic scholars). By 'literalist tradition', he means emphasis on 'minimalist Islam', focusing on the 'five pillars', and a negative and punitive interpretation of Islam.

Rahman argues that the intellectual tradition of the Quran requires that Islamic thought be dependent on a factual and proper study of social conditions in order to develop appropriate Islamic social norms for reforming society. For Rahman, intellectual and social reforms are an important part of the development of contemporary Muslim societies. These reforms require objective social scientific studies of modern Muslim societies and a deeper understanding of what he calls 'social thought in the Quran', which deals with the rise and fall of societies and civilisations, the moral decrepitude of nations, the function of leadership, conditions conducive to creating peace and prosperity, and 'the inheritance of the earth' (Rahman 1982: 161-62). This body of knowledge should be placed next to the pure moral thought of the Quran. He argues that, unless the material of the Quran is well systemised, it can be dangerously misleading to apply individual and isolated verses to situations, as Muslim preachers and many intellectuals tend to do.

Rahman goes on to elaborate his methodology and approach to social and religious reforms. The views of the Quran will

> ...remain at the pure abstraction unless a thorough factual survey is made of the relevant social data…It is of greatest importance to determine exactly where society is at present before deciding where it can go (Rahman 1982: 162)

The works of Clifford Geertz in Indonesia and Morocco (Geertz 1960, 1968), Gellner (1969) in North Africa, and Hassan (2002, 2008), Abou El Fadl (2001) and Rahman (1982) are illustrative of this approach.

Finally, the author would like to make some brief comments on the nature and public role of Islamist social movements in Muslim-majority and Muslim-minority countries. Social movements emerge as a response to collective grievances – and to mobilise the public to seek support to redress them. In recent years, the Muslim world has seen a resurgence of a variety of Islamic fundamentalist movements with agendas ranging from Islamisation of society to seeking equality of citizenship. Islamisation movements tend to arise in Muslim-majority countries, and the latter in Muslim-minority countries. Some of the Islamisation movements resort to extremist violence in order to achieve their objectives. An example of such movements is the Taliban movement in Pakistan and Afghanistan. But in Muslim-minority countries the goals of collective social movements are likely to be attuned to seeking equality of citizenship and access to survival goods. They can also resort to violence, but their aims are oriented towards achieving secular goals about social and economic well-being and equality of citizenship.

Concluding Remarks

The topic of socio-economic outcomes for majority and minority groups has been well studied. This paper has broken new ground by investigating the effect on the architecture of religiosity of majority–minority status in two Muslim-majority countries, namely Pakistan and Malaysia, and two Muslim-minority countries, India and Singapore. The findings show that the architecture of religiosity in Muslim-majority countries is comparatively significantly more orthodox. Religious orthodoxy is not merely a body of knowledge and beliefs but a practice which signifies a relationship between knowledge and power which seeks to regulate, uphold, require or adjust correct practices and condemn, exclude, undermine or replace incorrect ones. Muslim-majority countries are more likely to provide more fertile ground for hegemonic religious cosmologies than countries in which Muslims are a minority. The implications of the findings for the nature and type of civil society, role of fundamentalism, openness to religious reforms and nature of collective social movements have been discussed at some length.

. . . . .

References

Abou El Fadl, Khaled. 2001. *Speaking in God's Name: Islamic Law, Authority and Women*, Oxford: Oneworld.

Albrecht, Don E, Carol Mulford Albrecht, and Edward Murguia. 2005. "Minority Concentration, Disadvantage, and Inequality in the Nonmetropolitan United States." *The Sociological Quarterly* 46 (3):503-523.

Asad, Talal, 2009, "The Idea of an Anthropology of Religion", *Qui Parle* 17:2.

Blalock, Hubert M. 1956. "Economic Discrimination and Negro Increase." *American Sociological Review* 21:584-588.

Blalock, Hubert M. 1967. *Toward a Theory of Minority-Group Relations*. New York: John Wiley & Sons.

Blumer, Herbert. 1958. "Race Prejudice as a Sense of Group Position." *The Pacific Sociological Review* 1 (1):3-7.

Butler, D. 2006. 'The Data Gap: Statistics on Scientific Investment and Performnace are Lacking across the Muslim World', *Nature* 444:2 p.27.

Calhoun, C. 1993. Nationalism and Civil Society: Democracy, Diversity and Self-Determination, *International Sociology*, 8 (4):387-411.

Cohen, Philip. 1998. "Black Concentration Effects on Black-White and Gender Inequality: Multilevel Analysis for US Metropolitan Areas." *Social Forces* 77 (1):207-229.

Doty, Michelle, and Alyssa Holmgren. 2006. "Health Care Disconnect: Gaps in Coverage and Care for Minority Adults." *The Commonwealth Fund* 21:1-12.

Douglas, M. 1970. *Natural Symbols: Explanation of Cosmology*, Hardmondsworth: Penguin Books.

Durkheim, Emile. 2001. *The Elementary Forms of Religious Life: A Study in Sociology of Religion*, New York: Oxford University Press.

Frisbie, W. Parker, and Lisa Neidert. 1977. "Inequality and the Relative Size of Minority Populations: A Comparative Analysis." *American Journal of Sociology* 82 (5):1007-1030.

Geertz, C. 1960. *The Religion of Java*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Geertz. C. 1968. *Islam Observed: Religious Development in Morocco and Indonesia*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Gellner, E, 1994. *Conditions of Liberty*, London: Penguin Books.

Gellner, E. 1969. *Saints of the Atlas. London:* Weidenfield & Nickolson.

Gellner, E. 1981. Muslim Society, Cambridge University Press.

Glock, C. 1962. "On the Study of Religious Commitment." *Religious Education*, 57 (4): S98-S110.

Glock, C. and Stark, R. 1965. *Religion and Society in Tension*, Chicago: Rand McNally.

Gradín, Carlos. 2012. "Poverty Among Minorities in the United States: Explaining the Racial Poverty Gap for Blacks and Latinos." *Applied Economics* 44 (29):3793-3804.

Hassan, Riaz. 1985. Islamization: An Analysis of Religious and Social Change in Pakistan, *Middle Eastern Studies,* 21:3.

Hassan, Riaz. 2002. *Faithlines: Muslim Conceptions of Islam and Society*, Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Hassan, Riaz. 2008. *Inside Muslim Minds*, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Hassan, Riaz. 2013. *Islam and Society: Sociological Explorations*, Melbourne: Melbourne University Press.

Hassan, Riaz. 2014. "Imagining Religion: Portraits of Islamic Consciousness in Pakistan" in Jeffrey, R and Sen, R. eds. 2014. *Being Muslims in South Asia,* New Delhi: Oxford Universiy Press.

Hassan, Riaz. 2016. 'Indian Muslim Religiosity Survey', (Unpublished).

Inglehart, R. 1990. World Value Survey Questionnaire, *http://wvs.isr.umich.edu.*

Kahanec, Martin. 2006. *Ethnic Specialization and Earnings Inequality: Why Being a Minority Hurts but Being a Big Minority Hurts More*. Bonn: Institute for the Study of Labor.

Kurthen, Hermann, and Barbara Schmitter Heisler. 2009. "Immigrant Integration: Comparative Evidence from the United States and Germany." *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 32 (1):139-170.

Luhmann, N. 1982. *The Differentaion of Society*. trans. Stephen Holmes and Charles Lamore, New York: Columbia University Press.

Marty, M. and Appleby, R. eds. 1991. *Fundamentalism Observed*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Massey, Douglas, and Mitchell Eggers. 1990. "The Ecology of Inequality: Minorities and the Concentration of Poverty, 1970-1980." *American Journal of Sociology* 95 (5):1153-1188.

McLaughlin, Diane K., and C. Shannon Stokes. 2002. "Income Inequality and Mortality in US Counties: Does Minority Racial Concentration Matter?" *American Journal of Public Health* 92 (1):99-104. doi: 10.2105/AJPH.92.1.99.

Mohamad. M. and Saravanamuttu, J. 2015. "Islamic Banking and Finance: Sacred Aligment, Strategic Alliance" *Pacific Affairs*, 88:2:193-213.

Norris, Pippa. 2004. *Electoral Engineering: Voting Rules and Political Behavior*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

O'Neill, June. 1990. "The Role of Human Capital in Earnings Differences between Black and White Men." *The Journal of Economic Perspectives* 4 (4):25-45.

Quillian, Lincoln. 1995. "Prejudice as a Response to Perceived Group Threat: Population Composition and anti-Immigrant and Racial Prejudice in Europe." *American Sociological Review* 60 (4):586-611.

Rahman, Fazlur. 1982. *Islam and Modernity*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Rahman, Fazlur. 1989. *Major Themes of the Quran*, Minneapolis: Bibliotheca Islamica.

Rapoport, Hillel, and Avi Weiss. 2003. "The Optimal Size for a Minority." *Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization* 52 (1):27-45.

Robinson, J and Shaver, P. eds. 1973. *Measures of Social Psychological Attitudes*, Ann Arbor: Institute of Social Research.

Smedley, Brian D, Adrienne Y Stith, and Alan R Nelson. 2002. *Unequal Treatment: Confronting Racial and Ethnic Disparities in Health Care*, Washington, DC: National Academies Press.

Stark, R. and Glock, C. 1968. *American Piety and the Nature of Religious Community*, Berkeley: University of California Press.

Stephen, Walter and Cookie Stephen. 2000. "An Integrated Threat Theory of Prejudice" Pp23-45, in *Reducing Prejudice and Discrimination*, NewYork: Psychology Press.

Stephan, Walter, Oscar Ybarra, and Kimberly Rios Morrison. 2009. "Intergroup Threat Theory." In *Handbook of Prejudice, Stereotyping, and Discrimination*, edited by Todd Nelson, 43-59. New York: Psychology Press.

Tienda, Marta, and Ding-Tzann Lii. 1987. "Minority Concentration and Earnings Inequality: Blacks, Hispanics, and Asians Compared." *American Journal of Sociology* 93 (1):141-165.
Tamney, J.B. 1976. Religious Attitudes in Indonesia, Unpublished Questionnaire.

Watt, W.M. 1983. "Self Image of of Islam in the Quran and Later" in Hovannisian, RG and Vryonis, S. Jr. eds. *Islam's Understanding of itself,* Malibu: Undena Publications.

Williams, David, and Pamela Braboy Jackson. 2005. "Social Sources of Racial Disparities in Health." *Health Affairs* 24 (2):325-334.

Williams, Robin. 1947. *The Reduction of Intergroup Tensions: A Survey of Research on Problems of Ethnic, Racial, and Religious Group Relations*. Social Science Research Council Bulletin 57. New York: Social Science Research Council.

Wulff, D.M. 1997. *Psychology of Religion: Classic and Contemporary*, New York: John Wiley and Sons.